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Article
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is enlarging to the Western 
Balkans in the coming years. To become an EU member, the 
candidate countries must agree to certain values and princi-
ples regarding health systems, for example, the main focus 
should be put on primary health care (Council of the EU, 
2007). The countries must also commit themselves to the 
European policies and strategies for enhancing population 
health, for instance, the “Europe 2020” strategy (European 
Commission, 2015). In 2009, Serbia applied officially for 
EU membership, and in 2012, the country was granted a can-
didate status. Negotiations for membership began in January 
2014 (European Commission, 2014).
To commit to the context of EU integration and its common 
values and principles, Serbia reformed its health care sector 
after the overthrow of the Yugoslavian government in 2000 
(Simic, Marinkovic, & Boulton, 2012). Some of the challenges 
Serbia faces after the reform are (a) high referral rates from 
general practitioners to specialists, (b) a perception that special-
ists provide high quality care (World Health Organization 
[WHO], 2010), (c) weak contributions to the Health Insurance 
Fund by public enterprises experiencing economic difficulties, 
and (d) a deficit in funding for the health system (Simic et al., 
2012). The poor funding has lowered the quality of services, 
creating long waiting lists and lowering the quality of health 
care equipment and facilities (Karajicic & Mužik, 2014). In 
addition, the primary care system suffers from inadequate skills 
and competencies and the low economic and social status of 
health professionals (Simic et al., 2012).
The services of general practitioners are often seen as 
obsolete, and when they provide easy access to specialists, it 
is perceived as high quality health care (Simic et al., 2012). 
Because general practitioners are the gatekeepers to special-
ists or secondary care, informal payments may exist to facili-
tate access to these services (Simic et al., 2012). Today, the 
health care system in Serbia is characterized by a universal 
health coverage system that is both publicly financed and 
publicly provided. Private insurance can also be obtained to 
receive quicker access and enhanced consumer choice. 
These, however, are not included in the public insurance 
scheme (Karajicic & Mužik, 2014).
In 2015, the Euro Health Consumer Index (Health 
Consumer Powerhouse, 2015) compared the performance of 
health care systems in 35 European countries based on 48 
indicators. The Index ranked the Serbian health system as the 
30th among these countries. One explanation of such perfor-
mance could be drawn from Transparency International’s 
(TI; 2015) Corruption Perception Index, which ranked Serbia 
as 78 out of 177 countries worldwide in terms of its level of 
corruption. This is an overall perception of corruption and 
includes not only health care but all public sectors in Serbia. 
According to the United Nations Office of Drug and Crime 
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(UNODC; 2011), there are notable variations in bribes 
between the Western Balkan countries. In this article, bribes 
are understood as giving, receiving, or offering goods or ser-
vices to influence the actions of an official. Informal pay-
ments are, therefore, understood as a form of bribery. In 
Serbia, almost 14% of citizens at age 18 to 64 reported that 
they had directly or indirectly experienced bribery during the 
study period. Although there were variations between the 
regions of Serbia, 9% of the interviewees had paid at least 
one bribe during that period. In 56% of the cases, the citizen 
offers to pay, and in 14% of the cases, they are asked to make 
bribes to the public administration staff (UNODC, 2011).
According to several studies (International Federation for 
Human Rights, 2005; TNS Medium Gallup, 2011), the citi-
zens of Serbia believed that health was the most corrupt sec-
tor. UNODC (2011) found that one in three Serbian citizens 
who participate in any type of bribery do so to receive better 
service and one in five to speed up the service. Medical doc-
tors are one of the groups of public officials that receive the 
most bribes. In the present study, these illegitimate bribes are 
referred to as informal payments. The concept of informal 
payments also includes gratitude gifts. In this study, the term 
“informal payments” will, therefore, include both gratitude 
gifts and bribery.
Several studies (Avdyli, 2010; Colombini, Rechel, & 
Mayhew, 2012; Gupta, Davoodi, & Tiongson, 2000; 
Nekoeimoghadam, Esfandiari, Ramezani, & Amiresmaili, 
2013) show that informal payments have negative effects on 
health care access, equity, and population health. WHO 
(2000) claimed that any demand for out-of-pocket payment 
(formal and informal payment for health services) will lead 
consumers to reduce their use of health services. This may 
hurt particularly the poor by limiting their access to health 
services. Lewis (2007) claimed that informal payments 
sometimes exist alongside formal payments, and a distinc-
tion between these is difficult, which undermines the report-
ing of informal payments. Therefore, informal payments 
may cause inequity in the sense that they can impoverish 
some groups of society, whereas groups with greater 
resources receive better quality of care. Consequently, the 
financing of the health system determines the burden of 
health care payments in society and the level of protecting 
poorer groups from further poverty (financial risk protec-
tion; WHO, 2000).
Informal payments indicate poor health system gover-
nance as they are linked to a lack of control and accountabil-
ity in health care and weak rule of law (Gaal & McKee, 
2005). In addition, information about the existence of infor-
mal payments in Serbia is scattered, and there is a poor over-
view of informal payments and their consequences on the 
Serbian health care system. To identify future research focus, 
this exploratory study aimed to investigate Serbian civil ser-
vants’ (government officials, that is, doctors working in the 
health care system) perceptions on informal payments of the 
health care system (Gaal & McKee, 2004; Greer, Wismar, & 
Figueras, 2016; Vian, 2008). As this is a pilot study, only one 
country (Serbia) was selected for the empirical data collec-
tion. Only little evidence about the topic regarding Serbia 
was available. Knowledge based on existing literature from 
other Western Balkan countries completed the results 
(excluding Macedonia because no such study fulfilled the 
inclusion criteria of the literature review).
Definition of Concepts and Theoretical 
Framework
A variety of professions have acknowledged the existence of 
informal payments in health care. However, there are sub-
stantial differences in the definition of the concept and no 
definition covering the various aspects of informal payments 
is available (Cherecheş, Ungureanu, Sandu, & Rus, 2013. 
Vian (2008) argued that one of the fundamental issues that 
illustrate this conceptual confusion is the uncertain differen-
tiation between gifts and bribes in health care. One perspec-
tive features cultural aspects and sees informal payments as 
an expression of gratitude, whereas another includes feeling 
compelled to make unofficial payments to receive higher 
quality care. These payments vary from flowers, sweets, 
small tips, or large sums of cash (Gaal, Belli, Mckee, & 
Szócska, 2006). As concluded in the systematic review of 
Cherecheş and colleagues (2013, p. 110), the definition of 
Gaal et al. (2006) is the best yet available. Despite its limita-
tions toward solely considering informal payments as an 
additional payment on top of any formal out-of-pocket pay-
ment (Cherecheş et al., 2013), the present study will take 
inspiration from the definition described as
a direct contribution, which is made in addition to any 
contribution determined by the terms of entitlement, in cash or 
in-kind, by patients or others, acting on their behalf, to health 
care providers for services that the patients are entitled to.
Polese (2014) argued that there is a blurred line between gifts 
and bribes in that they depend largely on the context and 
long-term relationships that maybe generated from both gifts 
and bribes. Balabanova and McKee (2002) also doubted 
whether gratitude gifts exist in health care, as any payment 
favors the payer in obtaining preferential access to care. 
Liaropoulos, Siskou, Kaitelidou, Theodorou, and Katostaras 
(2008) showed that only one fifth of the respondents paid out 
of gratitude, whereas nearly half of the respondents did so 
out of fear of otherwise receiving lower quality care. One of 
those proposing a conceptualization of informal payments as 
an unregulated fee is WHO (2000), suggesting to define 
informal payments as an act of corruption (i.e., bribery).
Gaal and McKee (2004) attempted to explain informal 
payments through a theory that takes its starting point from 
Hirschman’s (1970) work on “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.” The 
theory attempts to analyze peoples’ reactions to a decline in 
organizations and states, which leave consumers (patients) 
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and employees (doctors) unsatisfied. In this case, consumers 
and employees would either leave the organization (Exit) or 
complain to available channels (Voice). The latter option 
assumes “Loyalty” to the organization, as voice is usually 
less effective and more risky (Gaal & McKee, 2004). 
Regarding informal payments, other characteristics of Exit 
and Voice are present insofar as dissatisfied people do not 
complain (Voice) or leave the organization (Exit) but seek 
change through informal methods such as payments or con-
nections. The latter resemble an internal/informal Exit, hence 
the term INXIT (Gaal & McKee, 2004). The theory explains 
some possible reactions from patients and doctors when 
unsatisfied with the organization of health care. Lewis (2007) 
and Gaal and McKee (2005) emphasized that informal pay-
ments are symptoms of poor management, underfunding, 
poor control in health care, lack of accountability, and defi-
cits in rule of law, that is, poor governance. Informal pay-
ments consequently appear to be linked to governance in 
health care, leading public and private spending in health 
care to have no impact (Lewis, 2006).
Vian (2008) illustrated the reasons and opportunities for 
informal payments and suggested that civil servants abusing 
public position and power for private gain do so because they 
feel pressured to abuse, because they are able to rationalize 
their behavior (e.g., individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and social 
norms influence informal payments, and to some individu-
als, it may therefore be morally acceptable to give civil ser-
vants money or gifts), or because they have the opportunity 
to abuse. Civil servants often act in a manner that maximizes 
their self-interest, weighing the costs and benefits of acting 
corruptly against acting with integrity (Vian, 2008). The 
opportunities to act corruptly are influenced by six factors: 
monopoly, which creates opportunities for informal pay-
ments by limiting the ability of citizens to choose other ser-
vice providers; discretion, referring to the autonomous power 
of civil servants to make decisions; accountability, which is 
governments’ obligation to demonstrate effectiveness in 
reducing informal payments; citizen voice, representing the 
channels and means for active participation by stakeholders; 
transparency, referring to the active disclosure of informa-
tion relating to decision making and performance measures; 
and enforcement, which is the collection of evidence of 
informal payments and the punishment of those engaging in 
such acts (Vian, 2008). These six factors are important in 
capturing informal payments and should be considered in 
strategies to tackle these.
Method
Empirical Part
Sampling. A purposive nonprobability sampling was per-
formed (Bryman, 2008) meaning that individuals who were 
appropriate for answering the research questions were 
approached. The participants were expected to be educated 
within the health care field (i.e., doctor, nurse, nursing assis-
tant) and fluent in English (due to the feasibility of the study 
it was not possible to include translators or other interna-
tional or local researchers). Online websites were searched to 
find participants at national and regional public health insti-
tutions and primary care centers in Belgrade and Vojvodina. 
The participants were sent an email, asking them to partici-
pate. The online selection of participants was necessary due 
to lacking network in the area and was a less time-consuming 
approach. Primary care centers were chosen, as they are pub-
lic institutions where informal payments have been claimed 
to take place (Simic et al., 2012). The Public Health Insti-
tutes in Belgrade and Vojvodina were selected, as they do 
research on population health and on performance and func-
tioning of the health care system. Other institutions such as 
the National Health Insurance Fund and the Ministry of 
Health were not included due to difficulties in locating con-
tact information on specific officials through the Internet. 
Networking would have been an appropriate approach for 
locating these officials, though time constraints made this 
unrealistic.
In Vojvodina, centers in the municipalities and cities of 
Novi Sad, Sombor, Pancevo, Zrenjanin, Kikinda, Subotica, 
Vršac, and Sremska Mitrovica were contacted. In Belgrade, 
centers were contacted in the municipalities of Barajevo, 
Cukarica, Grocka, Lazarevac, Mladenovac, Novi Beograd, 
Obrenovac, Palilula, Rakovica, Savski Venac, Sopot, Stari 
Grad, Surcin, Voždovac, Vracar, Zemun, and Zvezdara. Four 
participants from the Public Health Institute in Novi Sad and 
a primary care facility in Stari Grad agreed to participate.
Data collection and study participants. The data collection was 
conducted in Belgrade and Vojvodina in the first week of 
August 2014. The data consisted of two semistructured group 
interviews on-site and one follow-up interview through 
Skype (n = 4). Participants of the first interview were two 
public health officials from Novi Sad (Vojvodina) and those 
in the second interview were two health care providers from 
Belgrade. The Skype interview was with one of the public 
health official from Novi Sad. The participants were female, 
medical doctors, or specialists in social medicine and aged 
between 30 to 60 years. They worked as department heads at 
an institute of public health or as employees in a primary care 
center. The respondents of the on-site interviews were paired 
(two respondents in each interview) so that they could also 
assist each other with language difficulties, despite speaking 
fluent English, and to create better flow.
Interview guide and conducting the interviews. The interview 
guide included questions on the respondents’ beliefs about 
informal payments and their views on the health care sys-
tem and its governance, the functioning of the center, coor-
dination between secondary and tertiary care, and service 
delivery. The questions were based on Vian’s (2008) frame-
work, theory on trust derived from the study of Aasland, 
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Grødeland, and Pleines (2012). The themes of the guide 
were “perceptions on health care,” “corruption in the health 
sector,” “informal networks,” “trust,” and “equity.” The 
interview guide was pilot tested and revised twice before 
the actual interviews. The interviews, conducted in English 
and recorded on a dictaphone, lasted approximately 1 hr. 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim into Microsoft 
Word. Transcripts of the interviews were returned to the 
respondents to confirm their statements and to allow them 
to add additional comments.
Data analysis method. The phenomenological hermeneutical 
approach adopted from Lindseth and Norberg (2004) was used 
to inductively develop emerging themes. To understand the 
interviewees’ approach to informal payments, it was necessary 
to first apply this method to investigate their common percep-
tions of the term. To grasp the meaning as a whole, the text 
was read through several times, and an overall understanding 
of the data was formulated. In Lindseth and Norberg’s (2004) 
methodological description, this is called a naïve understand-
ing. This understanding guides the next steps in the analysis 
and must be validated through reading literature. The vali-
dated understanding then further guides the subsequent the-
matic structural analysis, where themes were identified in the 
text and separated into units of meaning. These units consisted 
of the respondents’ quotations and were marked with the 
respondent’s participant number. The units of meaning were 
printed out on paper to better manage the material and to iden-
tify sections and quotations that were similar and thus formed 
a pattern. Subsequently, these units of meaning were reflected 
against the validated naïve understanding, condensed into 
neutral summaries, and abstracted into main themes and sub-
themes. After this categorization, the themes were once again 
reflected on, reorganized, and sorted into final themes and 
subthemes. Finally, the findings from the data analysis were 
sent to the participants for feedback.
Ethical considerations. An application for ethical approval 
was sent to the Ethical Committee at the Institute of Public 
Health of Serbia including the informed consent form, the 
study protocol, and an explanation of the interview process 
and the interview guide. The Institute of Public Health of 
Serbia approved the ethical clearance on August 26, 2014. 
Despite applying for the Ethical clearance in a timely man-
ner, it was not possible to receive the final approval before 
conducting the interviews. Nevertheless, the researchers cor-
responded with a member of the committee during July 
2014, confirming the approval of the initial qualitative study, 
with minor revisions. Before conducting the interviews, an 
informed consent form was signed by the participants.
Literature Review
A literature review was completed to complement the quali-
tative data. An initial literature review was also conducted 
before the qualitative study, among other things, to narrow 
the study of informal payments to only one country (Serbia). 
The following literature review was focused on health sys-
tem governance and informal payments in all Western Balkan 
countries to get a broader view on informal payments in the 
area. The aim was to answer to the following question: What 
existing evidence is available on informal payments and how 
dispersed are informal payments in Western Balkan?
Inclusion and exclusion of studies and search strategy. Inclusion 
and exclusion of studies was completed in an iterative man-
ner, where search terms were redefined when becoming 
familiar with the literature. In assuring the comprehensive-
ness of evidence, the steps of phrasing the research question 
and searching and selecting relevant published and gray lit-
erature were repeated. The three overall search terms “Health 
Systems Governance,” “Western Balkan,” and “Informal 
Payments” were constructed, including 89 sub-keywords 
connected with the Boolean operator OR. The three overall 
search terms were initially searched separately in the eight 
databases of PubMed, CINAHL, Social Sciences Citation 
Index, Science Citation Index, Applied Social Sciences 
Index and Abstracts, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, 
Conference Proceedings Citation Index Science, and Confer-
ence Proceedings Citation Index Social Science & Humani-
ties. Afterward, a combined search of the separate searches 
was then completed with the Boolean operator AND.
Inclusion criteria were based on the number of Western 
Balkan countries included; whether concerning governance 
and informal payments in health care; sufficiency of quality 
and whether including primary evidence; studies from the 
time frame 1991-2015; or studies in English language. 
Excluded studies were unable to fulfill inclusion criteria or 
were duplicates. Both quantitative and qualitative studies 
were included, making this a mixed studies review.
A manual search was also conducted by looking through 
reference lists of relevant literature. Many articles were 
not in English, did not regard Western Balkan countries, 
did not meet all inclusion criteria, or were already identi-
fied. Therefore, no additional articles were included from 
this search.
Study selection. A total of 387 studies were identified from 
the search after 40 duplicates had been removed. In total, 277 
studies were excluded after screening titles and abstracts. 
Many of these had focused on the business sector or political 
or police corruption. 70 studies were examined more thor-
oughly, from which 64 did not meet the inclusion criteria. 
Finally, six studies were included in the review (Figure 1). 
Data from the six studies were extracted to Microsoft Excel 
to organize the data. Information extracted from the studies 
was completed with inspiration from Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination (2008) and included 18 indicators, that is, 
year, author, study design, aim/objectives, age, gender, and 
ethnicity of patients.
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Appraisal of included studies. The six included studies were 
assessed by using the Mixed Method Appraisal Tool (MMAT; 
Pluye et al., 2011), developed by McGill University in Can-
ada. The methodological quality was assessed using the cor-
responding criteria for qualitative, quantitative, or mixed 
method studies. A quality scoring system was performed giv-
ing quality scores of 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% for each 
study. One included study scored 50% (moderate) whereas 
five of the studies scored 75% (good), due to mainly lack of 
information in the reporting (Table 1).
Synthesis methods. A thematic synthesis method was used to 
interpret the data, to maintain consistency between the quali-
tative study and the literature review. The analysis was com-
pleted with inspiration from Popay and colleagues (2006), 
who also argue that thematic syntheses maybe used when 
synthesizing qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method 
studies. The quantitative variable labels that were included in 
the individual studies were extracted as themes in the same 
way as conceptual themes were extracted from the qualitative 
studies (Popay et al., 2006). These were then summarized 
narratively and are reported in the literature findings section.
Findings of the Empirical Part
According to the main themes (italics) from the structural 
thematic analysis, the respondents emphasized primary 
care as the main function of the health system. They also 
argued that primary health care is poorly governed by the 
state, which creates low incentives for doctors to perform. 
This poor motivation caused the doctors to not live up to 
people’s expectations for service provision. Furthermore, 
only the public provision of health care services is avail-
able in Serbia, but some larger cities have private benefi-
ciaries to support their health budget, causing an uneven 
balance between cities. In general terms, some respondents 
believed that primary care functions well. However, respon-
dents also stated that informal payments exist in health care 
and that poor communication caused informal rules to take 
over formal rules. Finally, transitioning into the EU was 
seen as a positive step, although the process of transition-
ing is perceived to move slowly. The main themes will be 
further elaborated in a narrative hermeneutic way.
Perceptions on Health Care, Service Provision, 
and Governance in Transition
The respondents believed that primary care was important 
because of its closer patient–provider relationship compared 
with secondary and tertiary care. They believed that health 
care benefited economically from a focus on primary care. 
Concerning governance, the data indicated that health care 
was poorly managed, which indicates poorly governed pri-
mary care. This was drawn from statements, among others, 
that there was poor communication between the three levels 
of health care.
The patient give[s] the paper to the nurse and she says “OK” and 
nothing; the doctor doesn’t see my reference. They don’t know 
what I have done before, and what is my suspicion, what I am 
thinking about the patient.
General practitioners were believed to be obsolete and inca-
pable of providing sufficient care to patients. This was related 
to poor communication between the three levels of health 
care, as the respondents believed that specialists undermined 
general practitioners, which caused inefficiency and mini-
mized trust between health professionals. Therefore, discrep-
ancies between people’s expectations of services and actual 
service provision were reported. The interviewees argued 
that trust in general practitioners had decreased primarily due 
to their low social status. However, the respondents felt that 
the poor funding of primary care caused more damage than 
this lack of trust. The respondents believed there were a lack 
of funding and an emphasis on specialist treatment within 
secondary and tertiary care.
They do not have enough tools to work with. So it is very 
difficult to work in primary health care because in general, we 
said that the most important part of the health care is the primary 
health care but when the Insurance Fund decided where to give 
the money, they give the money for hospitals and other centers: 
25% [of] financial resources are going to the primary health care 
and they said they must solve 80% of the whole health problems 
and needs.
Due to underfunding and poor resources in primary care, the 
respondents believed that citizens perceived primary care 
doctors to be incompetent. Specialist care was perceived as 
higher quality. Doctors, in general, were also believed to be 
unfamiliar with general practice when graduating from school 
Figure 1. Diagram of included and excluded literature.
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because schools emphasize specialist medicine. All of the 
above is believed to create an expensive health care system 
that is based on treatment rather than prevention. These fac-
tors were perceived to create low incentives for doctors’ per-
formance and poor motivation among primary care doctors, 
causing more inefficient service provision. The data indicated 
that poor resources in primary care were seen to be the reason 
why general practitioners referred patients to specialists. 
Consequently, general practitioners were perceived to have 
an obsolete function.
The main problem is, if the doctor wants to solve some problem 
(treat a patient in the primary care clinic), he doesn’t have 
enough tools and resources. So he cannot do that. So it is the 
main problem: it is easier to send him to the specialist.
Another example of poor incentives to perform, according to 
the informants, was the low salaries of doctors.
. . . one, they are not enough paid. Salary is disgracefully low. 
They are not paid enough to do their work. Today, also, the 
salaries are disgracefully low for that kind of quality 
professionals.
Low salaries also indicate a low position in the society of 
general practitioners. As a consequence of these factors, the 
respondents believed that some doctors have left the country 
to find more favorable jobs elsewhere.
The informants believed that there was a difference 
between rural and urban primary care centers. For instance, 
Novi Sad, an urban city, reported having several private ben-
eficiaries assisting with health care; these are lacking in rural 
areas.
So NGOs together with health institutions are providing some 
health care programs for the citizens of Novi Sad. All other, as to 
my knowledge, other municipalities, towns or cities in Vojvodina 
do not have that kind of budget.
Private practice was not included in service provision. 
Instead, patients who could afford to do so had the option to 
supplement public services with private insurance services.
Persons can also add private insurance. So, everyone is free to 
pay contributions to private fund and then make some additional 
health services, etcetera, or better conditions in hospitals, 
etcetera. So that is how it works in our country. Now.
The respondents believed that only a low percentage of citi-
zens could afford additional private insurance and that pri-
vate providers should not be included with public service 
provision. They also stated that they believed that a future 
plan of the government is to include private practice in pub-
lic service provision.
The informants felt that the transitioning into the EU 
would benefit Serbia. However, one respondent believed that 
some laws from the previous regime, Yugoslavia, were more 
favorable than those from the EU. For example, the EU 
immunization laws are believed to favor collective rights 
over individual rights.
Table 1. Description of Included Studies.
No. Reference Country Sample size Focus and aim Type Quality score
A Arsenijevic, Pavlova, 
and Groot (2014)
SER 657 People Quality and access indicators 
and patient payment for 
maternity care services
Mixed Method 75%
B Bredenkamp, 
Mendola, and 
Gragnolati (2011)
ALB
BH
SER
MON
KOS
49,848 people The effect of health-related 
expenditure on household 
welfare
Quantitative 50%
C Radin (2013) CRO 2,300 people Assess the relationship 
between corruption and 
trust in public health care
Quantitative 75%
D Tomini and Groot 
(2012)
ALB 10,839 households Explore the demand side of 
informal payments in in- and 
outpatient care
Quantitative 75%
E Tomini, Packard, and 
Tomini (2013)
ALB 10,840 people Analyze how much out-of-
pocket health spending 
impoverishes households
Quantitative 75%
F Vian, Grybosk, 
Sinoimeri, and Hall 
(2006)
ALB 131 people Help health planners to 
understand informal 
payments in government 
health facilities
Qualitative 75%
Note. See the appendix. SER = Serbia; ALB = Albania; BH = Bosnia Herzegovina; MON = Montenegro; KOS = Kosovo; CRO = Croatia.
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The huge way of solutions in the European Union is good, and 
we are happy to go there because, I think, maybe they will 
change the system of managing, and the transition become the 
real thing, not only the thing on paper. But in some way, they can 
look in local legislative and see maybe it is better.
Corresponding to the previous results on governance, two 
respondents believed that Serbia still had long way to go 
before becoming a democratic European country but that it 
was gradually transitioning into the EU.
Well, we are learning. We are learning the hard way, I think. It’s 
not something that is natural for us, still. We are far from that, 
you know. We do have it on paper, you know. We have a multi-
party system or something, but deep down, here and here [points 
to the heart and head] I don’t feel that very much. I don’t feel that.
There appeared to be a perception that traces of the previous 
Yugoslavian regime remained in Serbia. The informants 
believed, for example, that politicians did not fulfill their 
duty to transition into democracy. It was also alluded that 
general citizens did not regard solidarity and social capital 
(including informal and formal social networks) as common 
principles of society. Half of the informants believed that 
there were different societal aspects to living in rural and 
urban areas, and therefore trust and democratic participation 
were different between these areas.
Perceptions on Informal Payments
The respondents expressed belief that informal payments 
were present in the health system.
Yes, it exists, but in hospitals. Not in all hospitals, but partly. 
And hospitals in surgery department[s] and gynecologists.
Some of the respondents believed that specialists and the 
biggest branches of medicine were the most burdened, and 
therefore additional payments for services occurred. Half 
of the respondents said that the public perceived primary 
care to be transparent and open. They did not believe that 
informal payments occurred in primary care, especially 
given the increased licensing and accreditation in the area. 
This was, however, not the case for hospitals, as they were 
difficult to monitor because they provide a wider range of 
services.
They are trying to do that (monitor hospitals), but it is very hard. 
It’s hard to monitor their services because there is so wide [a] 
range of services. And I think it will be some time before they 
have to do like us.
Respondents further claimed that primary care should be 
the core of any health system, due to the positive patient–
provider relationship and the economic benefits. Although in 
Serbia, general practitioners were believed to be obsolete 
and incapable of providing sufficient care to patients. Also, 
the poor funding in primary care and an emphasis on special-
ist treatments increased the discrepancies of people’s expec-
tations of services and the actual service provided.
Due to underfunding and poor resources in primary care, 
the respondents believed that citizens perceived primary care 
doctors to be incompetent, perceiving specialist care as 
higher quality. The data indicated that poor resources in pri-
mary care were seen to be the reason why general practitio-
ners referred patients to specialists, indicating that informal 
payments may take place in this process.
The main problem is, if the doctor wants to solve some problem 
(treat a patient in the primary care clinic), he doesn’t have 
enough tools and resources. So he cannot do that. So it is the 
main problem: it is easier to send him to the specialist.
Low salaries and poor resources in the health system were 
also perceived as a reason for these informal payments for 
services, because low salaries indicate a low position in the 
society of doctors. Although, the respondents believed that 
the payments were based on patients’ willingness to access 
higher quality services and not on doctors asking for money.
You go to the operation and you want the best. Patients feel they 
have to pay, for that. For the best service.
Some respondents said that it was difficult to separate infor-
mal payments from gratitude payments and gifts. Giving 
gratitude gifts, such as flowers and cakes to doctors, appears 
to be a common cultural phenomenon. Such gifts are not per-
ceived to be an informal payment in Serbia, according to the 
respondents. Both paying additional cash informally and giv-
ing informal gifts were mostly to express gratitude for satis-
factory care, and the respondents felt that doctors would find 
it rude to deny such gratitude. It was also argued that these 
gifts create a positive patient–provider relationship. All 
respondents believed that any payments for extra care 
through informal payments would be of such a small amount 
that they were not significant. Therefore, they did not per-
ceive gratitude gifts as being unethical or informal payments 
as being a critical issue in health care. One of the respondents 
further believed that corruption was more dispersed in poli-
tics and that this was the area where action would be needed.
Bigger corruption is within politicians, not with the doctors. 
Believe me.
The media was also believed to exaggerate corruption, 
and the respondents perceived reality to be different.
They talk all the time, but they don’t say that it is one percent, 
ten percent or zero point one percent, of the health professional 
who were given some money or something. I don’t think it is fair 
to talk about that, because we are living in twenty-five years in 
very bad condition[s], and they never tell that. That, for example, 
a clinical doctor, they work for twenty-four hours for ten Euro. 
Do you know that, for example?
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Respondents also perceived that some informal rules took 
precedence over formal rules in the health care system. They 
described poor communication in health care as arising from 
the low status of general practitioners. Poor communication 
and mistrust in the competency of general practitioners cre-
ated illegitimate informal practices. Consequently, informal 
procedures took the place of formal rules, as general practi-
tioners used their friendly relationships with other doctors to 
navigate the health care system rather than their professional 
networks. It was evident that some general practitioners felt 
disregarded and engaged in informal behavior as a coping 
strategy. Therefore, when needing assistance or advice 
regarding treatments, general practitioners tended to contact 
friends rather than a more appropriate specialist for advice.
Findings of the Literature Review
Description of Included Studies
Five of the six included studies were peer-reviewed articles 
and one a working paper, mostly concerning Albania. Two 
studies considered informal payments in Serbia and the rest 
concerned Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, or 
Croatia. No Macedonian studies were in the included data. 
Designs were typically quantitative, with only one qualita-
tive and one mixed method study. Sample sizes also varied 
from 131 to 49,848 people (Table 1).
When examining the included studies, three overall 
themes appeared: (a) effects of poor governance and fre-
quency of informal payments in Western Balkan, (b) causes 
of informal payments in Western Balkan, and (c) informal 
networks in health care systems of Western Balkan. These 
themes will be elaborated below.
Effects of Poor Governance and Frequency of 
Informal Payments in Western Balkan
In their mixed method study from Serbia, Arsenijevic, 
Pavlova, and Groot (A) found that women frequently report 
paying both quasi-formal payments and informal payments 
for maternity services. Consequently, quasi-formal payments 
were a result of discrepancy between official and hospital 
guidelines, highlighting the poor governance in the system. 
The reported existence of informal payments varied a great 
deal from 2% in what they identify as the “pro-government” 
publications (from 2009), 10% to 14% in the “non-govern-
ment” publications (2000-2010), and 22.1% in the online 
questionnaires (2000-2008). In this study, the highest paid 
bribe amounted to 500 Euro. Despite these payments, women 
still reported problems with the quality of care they received.
Informal payments were also reported in a cross-sequential 
study from Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
and Albania, conducted by Bredenkamp, Mendola, and 
Gragnolati in 2011 (B). They found that informal payments rep-
resent a relatively large share of total health expenditure, and 
often among the poor population. Accordingly, Albania had the 
highest mean share of informal payments of all five countries. 
Also Albanian household in the lowest and poorest quintile paid 
on average 8% of their total health expenditure in the form of 
informal payments, compared with 4% in the richest quintile. In 
Kosovo, the share is more evenly distributed; however, the 
poorest still paid 2% of their total health expenditure in informal 
payments, whereas the richest paid 1%. In Serbia, however, the 
richest quintile paid a slightly greater share of informal pay-
ments (3%), compared with the poorest (1%).
In addition to this study, one working paper (D) and one 
article (E), both using data from the 2002, 2005, and 2008 
Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey, found simi-
lar results. The former study (D) found that the incidence of 
informal payments were fairly high in Albania; however, 
these were less frequent in outpatient care than in inpatient 
care. A general decline was also found in informal payments 
in 2005 and 2008, whereas the other study (E) found an 
increase in all health expenditure, including informal pay-
ments, from 2002 to 2008. (In all categories of expenditures, 
inpatient and outpatient public and private services related to 
medical fees, laboratory tests, drugs purchased, gifts paid to 
medical staff, and transport).
Both studies (D, E) revealed that poorest groups in 
Albania were those where a decline in informal payments 
was least pronounced. In fact, the amount that the poorest 
group paid informally increased almost 5 times over the 
years (121 ALL in 2002-777 ALL in 2008), whereas in the 
richest groups, the increase were more moderate (E). This 
increase in informal payments accordingly showed that the 
poorest group had an increased expenditure of informal pay-
ments from 7% in 2002 to 10% in 2005 and to 30% in 2008 
(of their total expenditure). Although, the increase was not 
accompanied by an increase in the relative per capita total 
expenditure and, further, shows that policy measures through 
2002 and 2008 have had a negative impact on the poorest 
groups in this study. Finally, in 2008, the poorest households 
had a relatively less budget than the rich if compared with 
2002, and the poorest faced higher out-of-pocket payments.
Older people in general paid higher informal payments 
for inpatient and outpatient care, maybe as they require 
more care than others (D). Generally, working-age adults 
were the ones that paid larger amounts of informal pay-
ments and patients in higher consumption quintiles spend 
more on informal payments for both inpatient and outpa-
tient services. However, they also found that health insur-
ance lowered the probability of paying informally for both 
health care services, but this factor did not affect the amount 
paid. Correspondingly, the results showed that generally 
vulnerable people having a smaller budget to pay for health 
care were more likely to pay informally (D). These results 
demonstrate an imbalance of informal payments and indi-
cate that vulnerable groups are more prone to informal pay-
ments, and that people with more resources spend more on 
informal payments.
Buch Mejsner and Eklund Karlsson 9
In a Croatian study, Radin (C) found that in 2007, those 
who experienced corruption and those that consider corrup-
tion in health care to be the biggest problem (salience) also 
did not prefer using public health care facilities. Although, a 
preference toward choosing these facilities increased in both 
indicators with age and settlement size. Also, an increase in 
age increased the odds of trusting public health facilities; 
however, in overall terms, corruption still lowered the odds 
of preferring public health facilities.
From the opinion polls of 2009, the results were different. 
Those with experience of and salience toward corruption in 
public health care were more likely to prefer public health 
care. Although, this preference decreased when having a 
greater degree of education, improvement in economic situ-
ation, and increase in settlement size. These results from 
2009 did not support the fact that health care corruption low-
ers trust in health care of the public sector. In fact, the effect 
of experiencing health care corruption had a positive effect 
on trust in public sector health care.
Causes of Informal Payments in the Health Care 
System in Western Balkan
In maternity care in Serbia (A), researchers discovered that 
women paying informal payments expressed dissatisfaction 
with having to pay, and reported that they only did so for the 
safety of their child. Among the women who did not pay and 
who did not have connections, 14 reported that they regretted 
this and would pay next time. These payments were in addition 
to the quasi-informal payments. Others paid informally due to 
the low salaries of providers. Patients in Albania correspond-
ingly recognized low salaries and considered their informal 
payments as contributing salaries. Providers further rational-
ized their behavior and claimed a higher standard of living (F).
Respondents of the just mentioned Albanian study recog-
nized that some informal payments were given as gifts to 
express gratitude. Although, other members of the public 
were, as in the study of Arsenijevic et al. (A), also upset to 
pay informal payments. Respondents reported that patients 
willingly paid informally to receive better attention, faster 
care or for a fear of substandard care, and a feeling of secu-
rity. Many respondents, both public and providers, also 
reported situations were no treatment was given if a payment 
was not made (F). This corresponds to findings in the study 
of Arsenijevic and colleagues (A), where respondents 
reported, that is, obstetricians to most frequently be paid, to 
secure his or her presence during childbirth, out of fear for 
substandard care and to secure better quality of care.
Informal Networks in Health System of Western 
Balkan
Several studies recognized that people in informal networks 
(i.e., friends with or related to a health care provider) are less 
likely to pay informal payments. One study (A) found in their 
questionnaires that 26 of the women who did not report bribes 
indicated that they had connections, such as friends, relatives, 
or colleagues, who helped them avoid informal payments by 
not accepting payments from them and ensured special treat-
ment and adequate care. The sample indicated that during 
2005-2008, the number of women reporting having special 
connections increased, whereas reporting informal payments 
decreased in the same time frame. Another study (F) similarly 
found that providers described lack of social connection as an 
indicator for increased willingness of providers to ask for or 
accept informal payments. Some providers even indicated 
that an informal payment was a way to “warm-up” or create 
closer provider–patient relationship. Tomini and Groot (D) 
described that rural residents paid less, but in general, they 
paid higher amounts of informal payments in outpatient care 
compared with residents of urban areas. This indicate that 
these rural residents do not pay in their own area due to social 
connections, but pay higher amounts in urban areas where 
such network connections are lacking and higher opportunity 
costs are involved. This is, for example, when needing care at 
larger hospitals in urban areas. The fact that vulnerable people 
were more likely to pay informally is attributed to the possi-
bility that people with more social connections and informa-
tion (social capital; for example, health care providers) are 
less likely to pay informal payments due to their network.
Discussion
Findings from the study indicated that the present way of gover-
nance of the Serbian health system might create negative effects 
for the system’s functioning. For example, the underfunding of 
health care and low salaries for doctors seemed to create imbal-
ances in the Serbian health care system, whereby informal pay-
ments were seen as a coping strategy. This is in line with the 
findings of previous studies on the subject (Arsenijevic, Pavlova, 
& Groot, 2013, 2014; Janevic, Sripad, Bradley, & Dimitrievska, 
2011) and which connect informal payments with poor manage-
ment, underfunding, or a lack of accountability (Gaal & McKee, 
2005; Lewis, 2007). Accountability is especially important in a 
democracy to hold civil servants responsible for inappropriate 
actions and to reduce the likelihood of informal payments 
(Greer et al., 2016; Vian, 2008). UNODC (2011) identified cor-
ruption and lack of transparency in the recruitment procedures 
when hiring for the public sector in Serbia. This may illustrate 
poor public management of the health care system that lacks 
integrity and transparency. When investigating Serbian’s per-
ception of transparency, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and TNS Medium Gallup (2011) further 
found that citizens regard transparency as being less important 
in the fight against corruption.According to Vian (2008), trans-
parency is a key factor in the fight against corruption. Comparing 
this with the INXIT theory of Gaal and Mckee (2004), the 
declining performance of health care in Serbia may leave 
patients and doctors’ needs unsatisfied. Patients and doctors 
may choose to leave the system (Exit); however, for patients in 
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Serbia, private practice is expensive and not commonly avail-
able and they may have no ability to Exit. This may foster the 
presence of informal payments, as patients secure themselves 
higher quality care (INXIT). Through Voice, patients can choose 
complaint mechanisms. However, studies show that some 
patients in Serbia perceive reporting of informal payments to be 
pointless, whereas others benefited from making informal pay-
ments (TNS Medium Gallup, 2011; UNODC, 2011). Informal 
payments in Serbian health care appear to be a strategy to infor-
mally “Exit” the system, violating the established rules and 
diminishing democracy.
Despite only describing others’ experiences with paying 
informally, the interviewed Serbians argued that informal pay-
ments were more pronounced in inpatient care services and 
that such payments in outpatient care services were not possi-
ble as the centers were working toward becoming licensed, 
which required more monitoring. The monitoring of hospitals, 
however, was perceived difficult, and there were still no inten-
tion on the part of policy-makers to start enforcing greater 
control in these institutions. Even though the respondents may 
not have experienced paying informally firsthand, this is wor-
rying in contrast to the ideas of poor technical skills in primary 
care providers, which facilitated high referral rates to special-
ist providers, and the informal networks between providers. It 
could mean that providers, being perceived as having poor 
skills and not being included in an expert network, are passive 
about recommending policies for health as stakeholders. These 
issues relate to accountability and citizen voice in Vian’s 
(2008) framework and affect the success or failure of policies 
(Greer et al., 2016). The study by UNDP and TNS Medium 
Gallup (2011) in Serbia similarly found public passivity and 
ignorance concerning the fight against corruption. There was 
also a perception among our respondents that corruption was 
given too much attention in the media and that the real prob-
lem in health care was not corruption. This may stem from a 
lack of knowledge about informal payments and gift giving in 
health care. Providers in Serbia may, therefore, not be held 
properly accountable for accepting informal payments.
There was a general perception in the findings that 
patients were aware of doctors’ low salaries and poor work-
ing environment; hence, they gave them gifts and money out 
of gratitude or to receive (better) care. Providers further 
rationalized their behavior and claimed a higher standard of 
living. Thompson and Witter (2000) found such low salaries 
to be an important reason why patients give both monetary 
and nonmonetary gifts to providers. In Vian’s framework, 
this is identified as rationalization and pressure to abuse. 
Doctors may feel a need to accept informal payments because 
they have debt and need to make a living. Patients rationalize 
their behavior by regarding informal payments as being 
acceptable in the current situation despite free entitlement to 
health care. Although as several of the Albanian studies in 
the literature review showed (D, E), such payments create 
inequity in access to services, as vulnerable groups have a 
higher likelihood to pay informally.
Doctors having the opportunity to accept informal pay-
ments (e.g., when a health system is poorly governed) will 
often act to maximize their self-interest. This may not be the 
cause of informal payments in some countries, although as 
Belloni and Strazzari (2014) described it, war can cause ille-
gal informal practices and corruption from informal actors, 
who exploit their influence in a transitioning country in an 
effort to maximize their self-interest, that is, due to high dis-
cretion or monopoly in health care services. Corruption is, 
according to these researchers, not a deviation caused by a 
few public officials but rather a structural matter that becomes 
standard operating procedure.
It is widely discussed whether informal payments are paid 
willingly or out of fear of substandard care. Petrovic (2014) 
found that people in Serbia bribe doctors for better treatment 
(providers identify an opportunity to abuse) and that corrupt 
officials may thrive in a system with low salaries (pressure to 
abuse and rationalization), low health care funding, and high 
unemployment rates for doctors (providers feel pressure and 
have an opportunity to abuse). When patients are ill-equipped 
to assess the quality and adequacy of physicians’ decisions 
and actions, informal payments maybe given to secure fair 
treatment. However, quality is often not maximized due to the 
patient’s inability to judge medical quality (Thompson & 
Witter, 2000). The poor knowledge of patients and the domi-
nance of public service provision (monopoly), as is the case 
in Serbia, limit the ability of patients to choose other provid-
ers for services, consequently facilitating informal payments.
Civil servants of the qualitative interviews further 
described that only a low percentage of doctors engaged in 
corruption, but that gifts to medical professionals were 
accepted. Giving gifts to health care providers in gratitude 
were only identified in one of the reviewed studies from 
Albania (F). Other studies concerning Serbia (A, B), Kosovo 
(B), and Albania (B, D, E, F) found patients paying infor-
mally for health care services, illustrating that these pay-
ments maybe more pronounced than the Serbian respondents 
initially perceive. In Serbia, gifts are seen as a token of grati-
tude to doctors (patients’ rationalization). Doctors have dif-
ficulty refusing these gifts, as patients will feel offended and 
will accordingly feel a pressure to abuse. Gift giving and 
favors among family, friends, and local government officials 
in postcommunist European countries are commonly viewed 
as social logic (Grødeland, 2013). The reciprocity of “giving 
and taking” is rooted in sociocultural factors, where patients 
may express gratitude through gifts (Gaal & McKee, 2004; 
Polese, 2014). Informal payments may, therefore, be under-
reported in Serbian health care, as gift giving is undeter-
mined. From the same perspective, the present study 
illustrated that gift giving created a positive patient–provider 
relationship, which maybe a rationalization by both patients 
and providers. However, some patients (A, F) were upset to 
pay extra for services that they were entitled to. Polese 
(2014) believed that informal payments may not only create 
a long-term relationship and social contacts but also produce 
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obligations of reciprocity. Petrovic (2014) argued that many 
doctors in Serbia are accustomed to receiving small gifts of 
gratitude but that up to 40% of doctors ask for such gifts, and 
a number of these also charge informal cash payments. It 
becomes a moral discussion then whether gifts are seen as 
gratitude or bribes. Petschnig (1983) denied the validity of 
gratitude gifts, exclusively believing that they are fees to 
obtain personal gain. Although WHO (2000) defined any 
form of informal patient payment (including gifts) as an act 
of corruption, in practice, it is difficult to determine whether 
payments or gifts are tips or bribes.
Despite innocent and kind gestures to medical profession-
als, both WHO (2000) and several researchers (i.e., 
Colombini et al., 2012; Grødeland, 2013; Gupta et al., 2000) 
showed that informal payments for health care can have neg-
ative effects on health status, health care access, and equity, 
as people delay seeking care or sell assets to pay for care. 
WHO (2000) believed that co-payments and informal pay-
ments for services will reduce demand in lower socioeco-
nomic groups. Some segments of society will not be able to 
pay additional health care costs, whereas other groups may 
receive additional care due to their higher socioeconomic 
status. It also becomes difficult for decision-makers to draw 
a line between gratuities and bribes when legitimating gifts 
in the health care system. In Serbia, further confusion is seen 
in the charging of co-payments for services. Distinguishing 
between formal and informal payments becomes difficult, 
affecting the reporting and perception of informal payments. 
In Serbia, it maybe uncertain to patients and providers 
whether they are acting corruptly because there is no clear 
understanding in the general public of informal payments.
Methodological Considerations
Sampling of the empirical part of the study was purposive to 
identify civil servants working in the health system. A further 
intention was to include patients and/or the general public to 
identify a broader perspective on informal payments, but this 
was not feasible, as a translator or local researchers would have 
been needed and also given the limited time and resources 
available for this research. For the same reason, only English-
speaking participants were included, potentially missing infor-
mation that could have been valuable to the study. Sampling 
bias is, therefore, a potential limitation to the study, and the 
purposive sampling was sufficient to develop an initial under-
standing, but is not generalizable. The literature review was 
conducted to strengthen the evidence of these qualitative data, 
providing a more solid understanding of the phenomenon of 
interest. Inclusion of studies was, however, narrow and could 
have provided a stronger evidence base with broader inclusion 
criteria. The purposive sampling of the public health institutes 
and primary care centers included inclusion and exclusion cri-
teria for doctors and public health officials within Belgrade and 
Vojvodina. Other cities could have been included, and more 
interviews could have been conducted. However, networking 
and additional calls would have been necessary for additional 
recruiting, which was unrealistic in terms of time constraints. It 
was also necessary to obtain approval from management before 
conducting interviews, which further limited recruiting. 
Although this is a pilot study, the included data are sufficient to 
suggest research that is needed to fill the knowledge gaps. 
Furthermore, a wider variety of professionals would still have 
represented the same institutions as already included, as other 
institutions declined to participate. Nonetheless, the literature 
review was conducted in a comprehensive manner, including 
data from several Western Balkan countries and enabling a 
comparison between the empirical findings and what is already 
known on the subject.
Three potential participants denied participating in the 
study when realizing the topic to be connected to corruption 
and in fear of consequences to the individual participants. 
Budak and Rajh (2012) argued that corruption maybe under-
reported due to citizen’s awareness that they live in a “sur-
veillance society,” combined with their memories of an 
undemocratic regime. This might prevent the reporting of 
corruption experiences. Some civil servants were also pro-
vided an option to fill out a questionnaire rather than to pro-
vide a live interview. Questionnaires were, therefore, sent to 
these respondents and to all potential participants who did 
not respond, to accommodate any reluctance to conduct a 
live interview, but none were returned. Sampling bias in the 
qualitative study is therefore present, as only those subjects 
who were willing and able to talk about health system gover-
nance and informal payments were interviewed.
Conclusion
Primary care was not considered to currently be serving as the 
core of health care and was perceived to be underfunded and 
inefficient. Underfunding and the poor motivation of doctors 
were perceived as incentives for corruption and informal pay-
ments according to the literature from other Western Balkan 
countries and the Serbian respondents of the empirical study. 
A related issue is the culture of gratitude gifts identified at all 
levels of health care. Difficulties in terms of defining the dif-
ference between informal payments and gratitude gifts were 
obvious, and if informal payments are perceived as legitimate, 
it might lead to underreporting, making the prevention of 
informal payments difficult. Moreover, a poor implementation 
of strategies tackling informal payments may worsen the situ-
ation, creating an increase in patients paying informally. Such 
consequences may exist particularly for vulnerable groups, as 
these were found in some studies to be more likely to pay 
informally. It may also be difficult for patients and providers in 
Serbia and other Western Balkan countries to separate legiti-
mate and illegitimate co-payments for health care. From the 
statements of respondents, scientific research (Gaal & McKee, 
2005; Lewis, 2006, 2007), and theoretical concepts (Gaal & 
McKee, 2004; Vian, 2008), this study suggested an association 
between poor governance of the health care system and 
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informal payments in Serbia. One of the most imperative 
issues identified was the value-laden and culture-bound per-
ception of what is considered an informal patient payment.
Implications for Future Research
A more comprehensive systematic review would be needed 
to examine research gaps such as the lacking scientific evi-
dence on informal payments by some vulnerable groups, that 
is, migrants. This includes also governance of the health care 
systems and implications of paying informally. More scien-
tific research is needed on the nature of gifts as gratitude to 
doctors and on patients’ trust in health care providers (deter-
mining, for example, their selection of health care facilities) 
and the quality of treatment that may lead them to pay doc-
tors informally. Future research should further focus on the 
implementation and effectiveness of interventions on infor-
mal payments such as the effectiveness of policy measures.
A more in-depth study through interviewing the general 
public and civil servants of the health care system would also 
be needed. The study maybe used to inform decision-makers 
on positive and negative aspects of ongoing anticorruption 
strategies. The aim should, therefore, focus on generating new 
theories on ways to implement strategies to combat informal 
payments in the Western Balkan health care settings.
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